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INCENTIVE-BASED COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE WELLS FARGO SCANDAL AND THE 
NEED FOR REFORM IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Ashley Triplett* 
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2011, Wells Fargo employees—without their customers’
knowledge or consent—“created millions of unauthorized bank and 
credit card accounts.”1  The fake accounts generated income for the 
bank, allowing the employees to boost their sales figures and, thus, 
earn more money under the bank’s compensation structure.2  The 
scandal propelled leaders at the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) to investigate the sales practices and incentive-based 
compensation structures at other large banks to determine whether 
their practices promote undue risk.3  
After the 2007 financial crisis, the government looked at incentive-
based compensation arrangements as one of the many causes of the 
crisis.4  “These arrangements serve several important objectives, 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A.,
Criminology and Criminal Justice, 2015, University of Maryland, College Park.
Special thanks to Professor C. Jones Havard, for her insightful guidance and
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journey; and to Devon, for his endless love and support.
1. Matt Egan, 5,300 Wells Fargo Employees Fired over 2 Million Phony Accounts,
CNN MONEY (Sept. 9, 2016, 8:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/
wells-fargo-created-phony-accounts-bank-fees/.
2. Id.  Wells Fargo has dismissed some 5,300 workers during the past five years for
such illegal practices.  Id.  The bank has agreed “to pay a fine of $185 million to
various state and federal agencies, including $100 million to the . . . [Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau], the largest fine ever collected by that office.”  Renae
Merle, Wells Fargo Boots 5,300 Employees for Creating Accounts Its Customers
Didn’t Ask for, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
business/wp/2016/09/08/wells-fargo-fined-185-million-for-creating-accounts-its-cust
omers-didnt-ask-for/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.9a77b2fd783c.
3. Evan Weinberger, Federal Regulators Open Review of Bank Sales Practices,
LAW360 (Oct. 25, 2016, 4:40 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/855483/federal
-regulators-open-review-of-bank-sales-practices.
4. See INST. OF INT’L FIN., COMPENSATION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: INDUSTRY PROGRESS
AND THE AGENDA FOR CHANGE 2 (2009), https://www.iif.com/file/7101/download?to
ken=xsksV4yg (“98% of . . . respondents [to a survey of banking organizations
engaged in wholesale banking activities] believe that compensation structures were a
factor underlying the crisis.”).
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including attracting and retaining skilled staff and promoting better 
performance of the [financial] institution and individual employees.”5  
However, “poorly structured incentive-based compensation 
arrangements can provide executives and employees with incentives 
to take inappropriate risks that are not consistent with the long-term 
health of the institution and, in turn, the long-term health of the . . . 
[United States] economy.”6   
Congress and financial regulators sought to combat the inherent 
risk in poorly structured compensation programs through legislation 
and principle-based, regulatory guidance.7  Under the authority of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank),8 financial regulators (Agencies)9 proposed a joint rule 
in 2011 (2011 Proposed Rule) meant to impose regulations 
surrounding these arrangements.10  In 2016, the Agencies revised and 
re-proposed the rule (2016 Proposed Rule), addressing public 
comments to the 2011 Proposed Rule and changes in the financial 
service industry.11   
In light of the conduct by Wells Fargo, the 2016 Proposed Rule has 
come under scrutiny as to whether, if finalized, it could actually 
prevent similar risky, incentive-driven practices in other banks.12  
While the 2016 Proposed Rule is an improvement on the 2011 
Proposed Rule and pre-existing agency guidance, the current 
language of the rule, if finalized, would be ineffective at preventing 
incidents like the Wells Fargo scandal.13  The Agencies should take 
measures to strengthen the 2016 Proposed Rule to better address the 
inherent risk in incentive-based compensation arrangements.14 
5. Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37,670, 37,673
(proposed June 10, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Proposed Rule].
6. Id. at 37,674.
7. See infra Part II.
8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
9. See Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170 (proposed
Apr. 14, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Proposed Rule].  The Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of
Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Director of the Office of
Thrift Supervision, the National Credit Union Administration Board, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency all jointly
proposed the rule.  Id.
10. See id. at 21,173.
11. See infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
12. See Alistair Gray, US Democratic Senators Urge Regulators to Strengthen Bank
Bonus Reform, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/fb33a347-
1578-3442-8ef4-f57b76927a42.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Section V.A.
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Part II of this Comment provides background on the fundamental 
pieces of banking legislation passed before and in response to the 
2007 financial crisis, and it examines current federal agency guidance 
meant to address incentive-based compensation programs.15  Part III 
examines the steps taken by federal agencies—using the guidance in 
place to combat inherent risk in financial institutions—to address 
Wells Fargo’s unethical sales practices throughout the five-year 
scandal.16  Part IV of this Comment details the 2016 Proposed Rule 
and how it differs from the 2011 version.17  Finally, Part V questions 
the ability of current agency guidance, as opposed to final agency 
rulemaking, to adequately address the inherent risk in incentive-based 
compensation programs.18  Further, this Part addresses whether the 
2016 Proposed Rule, in its current form, could be effective in its 
intended goal of disincentivizing risk, and it offers suggestions to 
strengthen the rule.19  
II. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Congress has sought to limit risk in the financial industry since the
Great Depression.20  After the 2007 financial crisis, Dodd-Frank 
specifically addressed incentive-based compensation programs and 
their inherent risk to the overall United States economy.21  Acting 
under the authority of Dodd-Frank, the Agencies issued guidelines 
and guidance, as opposed to final rules, to monitor the use of such 
arrangements.22 
A. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and Its Repeal
In response to the stock-market crash in 1929 and a banking panic
in late 1932,23 Congress passed the Banking Act of 1933, commonly 
known as the Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall).24  The main 
provisions of Glass-Steagall effectively separated commercial and 
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Section II.A.
21. See infra Section II.B.
22. See infra Section II.C.
23. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 9.02 (2017), Westlaw
BKLAR.
24. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 227
(2012)).
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investment banking.25  The Act imposed limits on permissible 
banking practices of securities firms,26 prohibited member banks—
any depositary institution of the Federal Reserve System—from 
affiliating with firms engaged principally in securities activities,27 
and prohibited officer, director, and employee interlocks between 
member banks and securities firms.28  The rationale behind Glass-
Steagall was that separating commercial and investment banking 
would lead to a healthier financial system, with less inherent risk.29  
Separation would prevent conflicts of interest, prevent exposure of 
clients’ deposits to the risk of a speculative market, and prevent 
unhealthy competition among financial institutions.30 
However, Glass-Steagall did not result in its intended divorce of 
commercial and investment banking.31  Section 16 of the Act set out 
permissible securities activities of national banks, “allow[ing] 
commercial banks to underwrite certain government securities called 
‘bank-eligible’ securities . . . and . . . permitt[ing] dealings in . . . 
[United States] government and agency securities.”32  Section 16, 
thus, created a loophole that banks would exploit in the coming 
decades.33  By the 1960s, as inflation began to frustrate banks’ ability 
to turn a profit, banks began to cross regulatory boundaries in order 
to expand.34  Instead of being met with opposition, the Comptroller of 
the Currency encouraged such expansion.35  Subsequent bank 
regulation and court rulings36 followed suit, “interpret[ing] banking 
25. See id.
26. See id. § 21.
27. See id. § 20.
28. See id. § 32.
29. See MALLOY, supra note 23, § 9.02.
30. See Amirsaleh Azadinamin, Separation of Investment and Commercial Banking 4–6
(2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://docplayer.net/32965938-Separation-of-inves
tment-and-commercial-banking.html.
31. See Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis––A Test Match for the Bankers: Glass-
Steagall vs. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1094 (2010).
32. Id. at 1097.
33. See id. at 1094.
34. See id. at 1095.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 37 (1996) (finding that a
federal statute pre-empted a Florida state law that prohibited banks from selling most
types of insurance); Nationsbank, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251, 260 (1995) (holding that banks could serve as agents in the sale of annuities
based on the Comptroller’s reasonable conclusion that brokerage of annuities was an
“incidental power” necessary to carry out the business of banking).
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laws in ways that allowed banks to expand into areas that competed 
with other financial services firms.”37 
By the end of the 1990s, the separation intended by Glass-Steagall 
was breached, and Congress repealed the statute with the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)38 on November 12, 1999.39  The GLBA 
repealed Section 20 and Section 32 of Glass-Steagall, allowing 
commercial banks to create “financial holding companies” and 
“financial subsidiaries.”40  These entities could provide a number of 
services, including investment banking, so long as they were 
“financial in nature.”41  This opened the door for commercial banks 
to enter other areas of finance.42 
B. The Dodd-Frank Act as a Response to the Financial Crisis
In 2007 and 2008, the United States economy underwent another
financial crisis.43  Lawmakers and scholars link the crisis to risky 
loans in the housing market, some encouraged by compensation 
structures at financial institutions.44  In the years leading up to the 
burst, banks began to offer a growing amount of subprime loans45 at 
37. See Markham, supra note 31, at 1095–96.  “The Comptroller adopted regulations in
1997 that permitted national banks to establish ‘operating subsidiaries’ to engage in
activities that a national bank could not engage in directly.”  Id. at 1099; Interpretive
Letter #845 from Raymond Natter, Acting Chief Counsel, Comptroller of the
Currency, to Karol K. Sparks, Krieg DeVault Alexander & Capehart (Oct. 20, 1998),
https://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/nov98/int845.pdf (“A
national bank may establish or acquire an operating subsidiary to conduct . . .
activities that are part of or incidental to the business of banking . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
38. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
39. See MALLOY, supra note 23, § 9.02.
40. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 101, 103, 121.
41. See id. § 103.
42. Markham, supra note 31, at 1104.
43. See, e.g., Ian D. Ghrist, How to Sufficiently Consider Efficiency, Competition, and
Capital Formation in the Wake of Business Roundtable, 14 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J.
BUS. L. 221, 222 (2013); Financial Crisis 2007/2008 Overview, WSO,
https://www.wallstreetoasis.com/financial-crisis-overview (last visited Dec. 30,
2017).
44. See Ghrist, supra note 43, at 223; see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xix (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter FCIC REPORT] (“Compensation systems—
designed in an environment of cheap money, intense competition, and light
regulation—too often rewarded the quick deal, the short-term gain—without proper
consideration of long-term consequences.”).
45. See Ghrist, supra note 43, at 224–25 (“Banks traditionally underwrite loans based on
the four Cs: (1) credit, (2) capacity, (3) capital, and (4) collateral.  A borrower who
takes out a subprime loan typically fails to demonstrate adequate strength in one or
more of these categories.”) (footnote omitted).
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artificially low rates.46  Many of the institutions’ compensation 
practices rewarded executives and employees for increasing the 
institution’s revenue or short-term profit without sufficient 
recognition of the risks the employees’ activities posed to the 
institution.47  Mortgage lenders would then sell these loans to 
investments banks who would bundle them into mortgage backed 
securities.48  As the housing market began to drop and the number of 
foreclosures increased, banks and hedge funds that invested in these 
mortgages were left with worthless assets.49  Then, one by one, some 
of the largest banks began to fail.50    
In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act.51  Dodd-Frank’s 
stated purpose is “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United 
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, [sic] to protect the American taxpayer 
by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices.”52  Dodd-Frank also aimed to correct the flaws in 
the previous approach to executive compensation.53  Those measures 
included shareholder votes on executive compensation, new listing 
standards to ensure that compensation committees and their 
consultants at public companies are independent from management, 
mandatory disclosure of executive compensation in relation to 
corporate performance, and recovery of erroneously awarded 
compensation.54 
Notably, Section 956 of Dodd-Frank requires regulatory agencies 
to jointly prescribe regulations or guidelines with respect to 
incentive-based compensation practices at certain financial 
institutions.55  Specifically, this Section requires that the Agencies 
46. Id. at 225.
47. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 44, at 64.
48. Ghrist, supra note 43, at 225–26.  This process is known as securitization.  Id.
Institutions would “aggregat[e] and pool[] . . . assets with similar characteristics in
such a way that investors may purchase interests or securities backed by those
assets.”  Id.
49. See Financial Crisis 2007/2008 Overview, supra note 43.
50. See id.
51. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. See id. §§ 951–57 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15
U.S.C.).
54. See id.
55. See id. § 956 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2010)).  The United States House of
Representatives recently passed the “Financial CHOICE Act of 2017,” which repeals
Section 956 of Dodd-Frank.  H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 857(a)(26) (2017); H.R. 10:
Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills
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prohibit any type of incentive-based compensation arrangement, or 
any features of such, that the Agencies determine encourage 
inappropriate risk.56  Such risk can manifest itself where the 
compensation arrangement: (1) provides “an executive officer, 
employee, director, or principal shareholder of the . . . institution with 
excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or” (2) potentially leads 
“to material financial loss to the . . . institution.”57  Further, the 
covered financial institutions must disclose the structure of its 
incentive-based compensation arrangement to the appropriate federal 
regulator.58  It is under this authority that the Agencies drafted the 
2011 and 2016 Proposed Rules to regulate incentive-based 
compensation arrangements.59 
C. Regulation of Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements
Empowered by Dodd-Frank, regulators have taken steps since the
financial crisis to address flawed incentive-based compensation 
practices.60  In 2010, the Federal Banking Agencies adopted the 2010 
Federal Banking Agency Guidance (2010 Guidance) that governed 
incentive-based compensation programs and applied to all banking 
organizations regardless of size.61  The 2010 Guidance utilizes a 
principle-based approach, requiring that: (1) incentive-based 
compensation arrangements “should provide employees incentives 
that appropriately balance risk and financial results . . . ; (2) these 
arrangements should be compatible with effective controls and risk-
management; and (3) these arrangements should be supported by 
strong corporate governance.”62  
The OCC reviews and assesses incentive-based compensation 
arrangements at individual institutions “as part of its normal 
supervisory activities.”63  Further, the OCC issued the Guidelines 
/115/hr10 (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).  The Senate has not yet considered a repeal of 
Dodd-Frank, therefore Section 956 is still effective.  See H.R. 10: Financial 
CHOICE Act of 2017, supra. 
56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 956(b) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5641(b) (2010)).
57. Id. § 956(b)(1)–(2).
58. Id. § 956(a)(1).
59. 2011 Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 21,170; 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at
37,670.
60. See, e.g., supra note 56 and accompanying text; infra notes 61–64 and
accompanying text.
61. See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,395,
36,396 (June 25, 2010).
62. Id. at 36,398.
63. 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,676.
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Establishing Heightened Standards for Certain Large Insured 
National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured 
Federal Branches (OCC Heightened Standards) that require covered 
institutions to establish and adhere to written risk governance 
frameworks to manage and control their risk-taking activities.64  
However, this agency action came in the form of principle-based 
guidance as opposed to prescriptive rules.65  While financial 
institutions are subject to this guidance, a principles-based approach 
gives the institutions greater discretion over the management and 
structure of their incentive-based compensation arrangements.66  
“[W]hen improperly utilized, discretionary decisions can undermine 
the goal of incentive-based compensation arrangements to . . . 
balance risk and reward.”67 
III. THE WELLS FARGO SCANDAL
The Wells Fargo scandal highlights the need for further supervision
and regulation of financial institutions.68  The timeline of the scandal 
and regulatory response demonstrates that the principle-based 
approach of standing agency guidance is ineffective at curbing the 
inherent risk in incentive-based compensation arrangements.69 
A. OCC Supervision of Wells Fargo’s Sales Practices
The Comptroller of the Currency, Thomas Curry, testified before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, in 
which he outlined the OCC’s supervision of Wells Fargo throughout 
the scandal.70  In March 2012, the OCC received some complaints 
from consumers and Wells Fargo employees alleging “improper sales 
practices” at the bank.71  Following inquiries into the complaints and 
a December 2013 Los Angeles Times article regarding the bank’s 
64. OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards for Certain Large Insured
National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured Federal
Branches, 12 C.F.R. pt. 30 app. D (2015).
65. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
66. See Julia Black, The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation 8 (London
Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci., Working Paper No. 17, 2010), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/
32892/1/WPS2010-17_Black.pdf.
67. 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,712.
68. See infra Section III.A.
69. See infra Section III.A.
70. Testimony of Thomas J. Curry Comptroller of the Currency Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. 1–9 (2016) [hereinafter Testimony].
71. Id. at 3.
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sales practices,72 the OCC examiners “initiated a series of meetings” 
with Wells Fargo management.73  The “[b]ank stated that it 
terminated employees as a result” of the complaints, “and that it was 
investigating such reports and re-evaluating its oversight of sales 
practices.”74  From 2013 to 2016, the OCC continued to supervise 
Wells Fargo’s sales practices and address weaknesses in the bank’s 
risk management.75 
In February 2013, the OCC issued a Supervisory Letter to Wells 
Fargo.76  The letter required “the [b]ank to develop its operational 
risk compliance program.”77  Throughout 2013 and early 2014, the 
OCC sought to address Wells Fargo’s sales practices “and monitor 
the quality of [the bank’s] compliance oversight.”78  In March 2015, 
the OCC “completed a multi-year assessment of . . . [Wells Fargo’s] 
compliance management systems,” applying the OCC Heightened 
Standards.79  This assessment “identified the need for the [b]ank to 
improve its risk management and governance related to operational 
and compliance risk.”80  Throughout 2015, the OCC issued a series of 
Supervisory Letters and Matters Requiring Attention requiring Wells 
Fargo to take “significant action” to address oversight failures and re-
evaluate its compensation plans “to ensure they did not provide an 
incentive for inappropriate behavior.”81 
72. E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo’s Pressure-Cooker Sales Culture Comes at a Cost,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-
fargo-sale-pressure-20131222-story.html.
73. Testimony, supra note 70, at 4.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 5.  “OCC-regulated institutions are subject to . . . ongoing supervision designed
to enable examiners to identify problems and obtain corrective action” without
formal enforcement action.  Id. at 3.  Examples of written supervisory actions
include “Reports of Examination, Supervisory Letters, and Matters Requiring
Attention.”  Id.
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 6.
81. See id. at 6–7.  The Matters Requiring Attention required Wells Fargo to address:
the lack of an appropriate control or oversight structure given 
corporate emphasis on product sales and cross-selling; the lack of 
an enterprise-wide sales practices oversight program; the lack of 
an effective enterprise-wide customer complaint process; the lack 
of a formalized governance process to oversee sales practices and 
effectively oversee and test branch sales practices; and the failure 
of the [b]ank’s audit services to identify the above issues or to 
aggregate sales practice issues into an enterprise view. 
Id. at 6–7. 
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The OCC then issued its annual Report of Examination in July 
2015, which noted that Wells Fargo “needed to act more 
proactively.”82  This report was followed by a Notice of Deficiency 
on July 28, 2015, which cited the bank’s failure to comply with the 
expectation in the OCC Heightened Standards.83  The OCC continued 
to review these matters into 2016, and it concluded in its 2016 Report 
of Examination that Wells Fargo’s “sales practices were unethical; 
the [b]ank’s actions caused harm to consumers; and [b]ank 
management had not responded promptly to address these issues.”84  
The Comptroller concluded his testimony by stating: “It is clear . . . 
that the misaligned priorities and unacceptable behavior at Wells 
Fargo resulted in unsafe and unsound practices that led to widespread 
consumer harm.  Issues of incentive compensation are relevant to 
ensuring behavior aligns with acceptable corporate practice.”85  The 
Comptroller’s testimony suggests that the principles-based regulatory 
guidance in place after Dodd-Frank, alone, is ineffective at curbing 
risky, anti-consumer banking practices.86  A more prescriptive agency 
rule would be better equipped to address the risk inherent in such 
compensation practices.87 
IV. AN ATTEMPT TO CURB INCENTIVE-BASED
COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS
Section 956 of Dodd-Frank authorizes regulatory agencies to 
prescribe rules and guidelines to target incentive-based compensation 
arrangements that the Agencies believe promote undue risk.88  In 
April 2011, the Agencies published a joint notice of proposed 
rulemaking to implement Section 956.89  In light of developments in 
incentive-based compensation practices in the financial services 
industry90 and comments received on the 2011 Proposed Rule, the 
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id. at 7–8.
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87. See infra Part V.
88. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
89. 2011 Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 21,170.
90. See 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,678.
In June 2013, the European Union adopted the Capital 
Requirements Directive (“CRD”) IV, which sets out requirements 
for compensation structures, policies, and practices that apply to 
all banks and investment firms subject to the CRD. . . .  Also in 
2013, the . . . [European Banking Authority] finalized the process 
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agencies revised and re-proposed the Rule in 2016.91  This section 
outlines both the 2011 Proposed Rule and the 2016 Proposed Rule 
and highlights the adjustments and changes made between the two.92 
A. The 2011 Proposed Rule
The 2011 Proposed Rule would have prohibited “incentive-based
compensation arrangements . . . that [could] encourage inappropriate 
risks.”93  The Rule “would have required compensation practices at 
regulated financial institutions to be consistent with three key 
principles—that incentive-based compensation arrangements should 
[(1)] appropriately balance risk and financial rewards, [(2)] be 
compatible with effective risk management and controls, and [(3)] be 
supported by strong corporate governance.”94  Financial institutions 
with $1 billion or more in assets95 would have been required to have 
policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the requirements 
of the Rule and submit annual reports to their federal regulator 
outlining the structure of their compensation arrangements.96 
The 2011 Proposed Rule would have imposed two additional 
requirements for “larger covered financial institutions.”97  First, these 
institutions would have been required to defer at least fifty percent of 
the incentive-based compensation for executive officers for a period 
of at least three years.98  Second, the Rule would have required the 
board of directors to identify and approve the incentive-based 
compensation for those covered persons who had “the ability to 
expose the institution to possible losses that are substantial in relation 
to the institution’s size, capital, or overall risk tolerance.”99 
The Agencies received over 10,000 comments for the 2011 
Proposed Rule, which varied on different methods to strengthen the 
Rule.100  Suggestions included extending the deferral period to five 
and criteria for the identification of categories of staff who have a 
material impact on the institution’s risk profile . . . . 
Id. 
91. See id. at 37,673.
92. See infra Sections IV.A–B.
93. 2011 Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 21,173.
94. 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,677.
95. 2011 Proposed Rule, supra note 9, at 21,174.
96. See id. at 21,194.
97. Id. at 21,180.  A “larger covered financial institution” is generally one “with $50
billion or more in total consolidated assets.”  Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 21,181.
100. 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,677.
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years for executive bonuses and increasing the amount of 
compensation subject to the deferral requirements; defining 
“excessive compensation”; and “[a]dopting a corporate governance 
measure tied to stock ownership by board members.”101  Many 
covered institutions and financial industry associations commented 
on the Rule.102  Their comments raised questions concerning the 
scope of the Rule, opposed the mandatory deferral provision, and 
requested that “the final rule provide specific standards for 
determining when compensation is excessive.”103 
B. The 2016 Proposed Rule
Like the 2011 Proposed Rule, the 2016 Proposed Rule would
prohibit incentive-based compensation arrangements at covered 
institutions that could encourage inappropriate risks.104  The 2016 
Proposed Rule “provides that compensation, fees, and benefits will 
be considered excessive when amounts paid are unreasonable or 
disproportionate to the value of the services performed by a covered 
person.”105  Further, compensation arrangements “will be considered 
to encourage inappropriate risks[,] . . . unless the arrangement: 
[a]ppropriately balances risk and reward; . . . [i]s compatible with
effective risk management and controls; and . . . [i]s supported by
effective governance.”106  However, unlike the 2011 Proposed Rule,
the 2016 Proposed Rule specifies that a compensation arrangement
would not “appropriately balance risk and reward unless it: . . .
[i]ncludes financial and non-financial measures of performance; . . .
[i]s designed to allow non-financial measures of performance to
override financial measures of performance, when appropriate; and . .
. [i]s subject to adjustment to reflect actual losses, inappropriate risks
taken, [or] compliance deficiencies.”107
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 37,679.
105. Id.  This assessment takes into consideration relevant factors including: (1) “[t]he
combined value of all compensation, fees, or benefits provided to a covered person;”
(2) “[t]he compensation history of the covered person . . . ;” (3) “[t]he financial
condition of the covered institution;” (4) “[c]ompensation practices at comparable
institutions . . . ;” and (5) “[a]ny connection between the covered person and any
fraudulent act or omission, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or insider abuse with
regard to the covered institution.”  Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 37,679–80.
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The 2016 Rule also categorizes covered institutions into three 
levels “based on average total consolidated assets,”108 imposing 
stricter requirements for Level 1 and Level 2 covered institutions.109  
Additionally, the Rule includes a definition of “significant risk-
taker,” which is intended to include individuals who are not “senior 
executive officers,”110 but individuals who “are in the position to put 
a Level 1 or Level 2 covered institution at risk of material financial 
loss.”111  As Wells Fargo would be considered a Level 1 covered 
institution,112 the rest of this section will focus on the requirements 
for Level 1 institutions only.113  Specifically, this section will analyze 
the 2016 Proposed Rule’s requirements and prohibitions concerning 
deferral, forfeiture and downward adjustment, and the clawback of 
incentive-based compensation.114 
1. Deferral
As a tool to balance risk and reward, the Rule would require 
covered institutions to defer the vesting115 “of a certain portion of all 
incentive-based compensation awarded.”116  The institution must 
108. Id. at 37,679 (“Level 1 (greater than or equal to $250 billion); . . . Level 2 (greater
than or equal to $50 billion and less than $250 billion); and . . . Level 3 (greater than
or equal to $1 billion and less than $50 billion).”) (footnotes omitted).
109. See id.
110. Id. at 37,801–02.  “Senior executive officer” can include: “[p]resident, chief
executive officer, executive chairman, chief operating officer, chief financial officer,
chief investment officer, chief legal officer, chief lending officer, chief risk officer,
chief compliance officer, chief audit executive, chief credit officer, chief accounting
officer, or head of a major business line or control function.”  Id. at 37,801.
111. Id. at 37,692.
112. See Investment Profile, WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/investor-
relations/investment-profile/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).  As of June 30, 2017, Wells
Fargo has an average of $1.9 trillion in consolidated assets, the third largest in the
United States.  Id.
113. See infra Sections IV.B.1–3.
114. See infra Sections IV.B.1–3.  The 2016 Proposed Rule sets forth additional
requirements and prohibitions, including: prohibiting the purchase of hedging
instruments to offset any decrease in the value of compensation; prohibiting
awarding compensation in excess of 125 percent of the targeted amount of
compensation; and setting minimum requirements for risk management framework
and governance structures.  See 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,681,
37,734.
115. 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,717.  “Vesting of incentive-based
compensation means the transfer of ownership of the incentive-based compensation
to the covered person to whom the incentive-based compensation was awarded, such
that the covered person’s right to the incentive-based compensation is no longer
contingent on the occurrence of any event.”  Id. at 37,802.
116. Id. at 37,717.
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“defer at least 60 percent of each senior executive officer’s qualifying 
incentive-based compensation for at least four years, and at least 60 
percent of . . . compensation awarded under a long-term incentive 
plan for at least two years beyond the end of that plan’s performance 
period.”117  The institution must follow the same requirements for 
significant risk-takers, however, the deferral amount is decreased to 
at least fifty percent of their compensation.118  
A covered institution would be permitted to engage in pro rata 
vesting, allowing the institutions “to make deferred incentive-based 
compensation eligible for vesting during the deferral period on a 
schedule that paid out equal amounts on each anniversary of the end 
of the relevant performance period.”119  Additionally, the Rule 
generally prohibits “the acceleration of vesting and subsequent 
payment of incentive-based compensation that is required to be 
deferred.”120  
2. Forfeiture and Downward Adjustment
Forfeiture and downward adjustment review would require the 
covered institutions “to consider reducing some or all of a senior 
executive officer’s or significant risk-taker’s incentive-based 
compensation when the covered institution becomes aware of 
inappropriate risk-taking or other . . . behavior that could lead to 
material financial loss.”121  This could be accomplished “by reducing 
the amount of unvested deferred incentive-based compensation 
(forfeiture), by reducing the amount of . . . compensation not yet 
awarded for a performance period that has begun (downward 
adjustment), or . . . a combination of both.”122 
The 2016 Proposed Rule would require the institutions to place 
“100 percent of . . . deferred and unvested incentive-based 
compensation” at risk of forfeiture and downward adjustment.123  The 
Rule lists events that trigger forfeiture and downward adjustment 
117. Id. (footnote omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 37,718 (“For example, if a Level 1 covered institution is required to defer
$100,000 of a senior executive officer’s incentive-based compensation for four
years, the covered institution could choose to make $25,000 available for vesting on
each anniversary of the end of the performance period for which the $100,000 was
awarded.”).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 37,728.
122. Id.  The Rule would require the institutions “to formalize the governance and review
processes surrounding such decision-making, and to document the decisions made.”
Id.
123. Id. at 37,729.
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review124 and allows the institution to determine how much reduction 
in compensation is warranted, subject to review by the appropriate 
regulator.125 
3. Clawback Provisions
The 2016 Proposed Rule would also require “covered institutions 
to include clawback provisions in [their] incentive-based 
compensation arrangements,”126 something the 2011 Proposed Rule 
did not require.127  “[A]t a minimum, [the clawback provisions] 
would allow for the recovery of up to 100 percent of vested 
incentive-based compensation from a current or former senior 
executive officer or significant risk-taker for seven years following 
the date on which such compensation vests.”128  
The Rule identifies three triggers for invoking the clawback 
provision that “include situations where a senior executive officer or 
significant risk-taker engaged in: (1) [m]isconduct that resulted in 
significant financial or reputational harm to the covered institution; 
(2) fraud; or (3) intentional misrepresentation of information used to
determine the senior executive officer’s or significant risk-taker’s
incentive-based compensation.”129  Yet, while the Rule requires a
clawback provision and identifies these triggers, the Rule would not
require that the “covered institutions exercise the clawback
provision.”130
124. See id.  Such events include:
(1) Poor financial performance attributable to a significant
deviation from the risk parameters set forth in the covered
institution’s policies and procedures; (2) inappropriate risk-taking,
regardless of the impact on financial performance; (3) material
risk management or control failures; and (4) non-compliance with
statutory, regulatory, or supervisory standards that results in:
Enforcement or legal action against the covered
institution brought by a Federal or state regulator or agency.
Id. 
125. See id. at 37,730.
126. Id. at 37,731.  “Clawback” is “a mechanism by which a covered institution can
recover vested incentive-based compensation from a covered person.”  Id.
127. Id. at 37,732.
128. Id. at 37,731.
129. Id. at 37,731–32 (footnotes omitted).
130. Id. at 37,732.
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V. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE 2016 PROPOSED
RULE
While an improvement from the 2011 Proposed Rule, the 2016 
Proposed Rule, in its current form, would be ineffective.  It gives 
covered institutions too much discretion in determining whether to 
utilize some of the key provisions of the Rule meant to disincentivize 
risk.131  These loopholes would significantly undermine the 
effectiveness of the rule in practice and would allow covered 
institutions to pay a majority of compensation despite inappropriate 
risk-taking.132  In light of this, the 2016 Proposed Rule should adopt 
the following suggested changes to adequately address the inherent 
risks in incentive-based compensation arrangements.133 
A. Suggestions to Strengthen the 2016 Proposed Rule
1. Extend the Deferral Period
If the goal of the deferral period is to disincentivize risk within the 
institution,134 the deferral period must be extended.  The Rule 
currently proposes that institutions would defer sixty percent of 
compensation for a period of four years, and it allows equal pro rata 
payments over those four years.135  This would mean that high-
ranking senior executives at some of the country’s largest financial 
institutions “could receive 70% of incentive pay within two years and 
85% within three years (40% in the initial performance year, and then 
an additional 15% per year after that).”136  Further, the length of a 
typical business cycle is roughly six years.137  This suggests “that the 
costs of inappropriate risk-taking” may not be realized before a large 
131. See infra Section V.A.
132. See infra Section V.A.
133. See infra Section V.A.
134. See 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,717.
135. Id. at 37,717–18.
136. Letter from Ams. for Fin. Reform to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. et al. 3 (July 22, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/co
mments/s7-07-16/s70716-52.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Ams. for Fin. Reform].
This calculation is obtained by: (1) starting with the forty percent of compensation
that is not required to be deferred; (2) splitting the deferred sixty percent into four
equal payments of fifteen percent for each year of the four-year period; and (3)
adding a fifteen percent payment after the end of each year’s compensation period.
See id.
137. 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,721 n.154 (“From 1945 to 2009, the
average length of the business cycle in the . . . [United States] was approximately 5.7
years.”).
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majority of the compensation has been paid out to the senior 
executive officer or significant risk-taker.138  
The OCC began reviewing Wells Fargo’s sales practices in 2012 
after receiving complaints,139 and it was not until 2016 that the OCC 
declared the practices unethical.140  Within that time frame, the bank, 
under the current language of the 2016 Proposed Rule, could have 
paid out over 85% of compensation for senior executives despite the 
ongoing regulatory supervision and inappropriate risk-taking.141  This 
issue is further frustrated by the weak clawback requirement within 
the 2016 Proposed Rule.142  Without a mandatory clawback 
requirement,143 there is no incentive to avoid inappropriate risk-
taking, knowing that a majority of the deferred, vested compensation 
will be safe from recoupment. 
The deferral period must be extended to compensate for these 
issues.  The United Kingdom Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
has imposed a deferral period of seven years for senior executives, 
with pro rata vesting beginning no sooner than the third anniversary 
of the reward.144  This is more than double the level of effective 
deferral that the 2016 Proposed Rule requires for senior executive 
officers.145  For the Rule to be effective, the deferral period should be 
extended to at least six years to coincide with the typical business 
cycle.146  This would allow for more opportunities to address 
inappropriate risk-taking before a vast majority of compensation has 
been paid.147  
2. Limit the Discretion Given to Covered Institutions
Under the 2016 Proposed Rule, whether the financial institution 
chooses to exercise the forfeiture and downward adjustment review 
and the mandatory clawback provision is left to the discretion of the 
138. Letter from Ams. for Fin. Reform, supra note 136, at 3.
139. See Testimony, supra note 70, at 3–4.
140. See id. at 8.
141. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text.
143. See 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,732.
144. See PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., STRENGTHENING THE ALIGNMENT OF RISK AND
REWARD: NEW REMUNERATION RULES 6 (2015), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pr
a/Documents/publications/ps/2015/ps1215.pdf.
145. See id.; see also 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,717 (providing for a
deferral period of four years with pro rata vesting beginning on the one-year
anniversary for senior executives).
146. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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institution.148  The Rule states only that “the forfeiture and downward 
adjustment review requirements . . . would require a Level 1 . . . 
covered institution to consider reducing some or all of a senior 
executive officer’s or significant risk-taker’s incentive-based 
compensation when the covered institution becomes aware of 
inappropriate risk-taking.”149  Further, the Rule explicitly states that it 
would not require the covered institutions to exercise the clawback 
provision upon one of the three triggers.150 
Both provisions were included in the 2016 Proposed Rule to 
disincentivize senior executive officers and significant risk-takers 
from engaging in risky behavior that could lead to “material financial 
loss.”151  Yet, without a clear requirement to enforce the provisions, 
the Agencies cannot ensure that such steps will be taken.  Clawback 
provisions are fairly common in financial institutions, yet recoupment 
is rare.152  The 2016 Proposed Rule should be adjusted to require that 
both the clawback provision and the forfeiture and downward 
adjustment review be mandatory in order to properly disincentivize 
risky behavior. 
3. Hold Senior Executive Officers Accountable
By making the clawback provision mandatory, the next issue 
concerns when the provision must be exercised.  In its current form, 
the Rule lists three triggers for exercising the clawback provision: 
“(1) Misconduct that resulted in significant financial or reputational 
harm to the covered institution; (2) fraud; or (3) intentional 
misrepresentation of information used to determine the senior 
executive officer’s or significant risk-taker’s incentive-based 
compensation.”153  The Rule goes on to state that “[i]f a . . . covered 
institution discovers that a senior executive officer or significant risk-
taker was involved in one of the triggering circumstances . . . the 
institution would potentially be able to recover from 
that” individual.”154  
148. See infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
149. 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,728 (emphasis added).
150. See id. at 37,732.
151. See id. at 37,678–79.
152. See Michael Greene, Will Wells Fargo Scandal Lead to Changes in Pay Plans?,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.bna.com/wells-fargo-scandal-
n57982078163/ (“According to ISS Corporate Solutions, 86.4 percent of S&P 500
companies and 70.5 percent of S&P Midcap 400 companies have clawback
provisions.”).
153. 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,731–32 (footnotes omitted).
154. Id. at 37,732.
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The wording of the Rule suggests that the clawback triggers apply 
only to individual employee misconduct.155  In the case of Wells 
Fargo, the individual sales employees who created the fake accounts 
would arguably have triggered the clawback provision by engaging in 
“[m]isconduct that resulted in significant financial or reputational 
harm”156 to the bank.  But what about supervisors and senior 
executives who did not individually create the fake accounts or order 
these anti-consumer practices?  Could they trigger the clawback 
provision if they did not engage in such conduct, but allowed it to 
continue? 
It is unclear whether the triggers would be interpreted to cover 
failures in risk management or inadequate supervision.  To address 
this, the Rule should be revised to state that the clawback provision 
can be triggered when a senior executive official or significant risk-
taker participated in or was responsible for misconduct that resulted 
in significant financial or reputational harm.157  This is the standard 
currently used by the PRA,158 and it is better suited to disincentivize 
risky behavior throughout the supervisory chain than the current 
Rule. 
B. What Do the Financial Institutions Have to Say?
In their comments to the 2016 Proposed Rule, many financial
institutions and interest groups have opposed the attempt by the 
Agencies to impose regulations on incentive-based compensation 
arrangements.159  Primarily, they are concerned that the restrictions 
on compensation structures will limit the ability of institutions to 
155. See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text.
156. 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,731–32.
157. Cf. id. (limiting the clawback provision to senior executive officers and significant
risk takers who “engaged in” one of the three triggers).
158. See PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., supra note 144, Annex A at 14–15.
159. See, e.g., Letter from Henry D. Eickelberg, Chief Operating Officer, Ctr. on Exec.
Comp., to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al. (July 22, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=OCC-2011-0001-
2412&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [hereinafter Ctr. on Exec. Comp.
Letter]; Letter from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., President & CEO, SIFMA, to Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency et al. (July 22, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/c
ontentStreamer?documentId=OCC-2011-0001-2402&attachmentNumber=1&conten
tType=pdf [hereinafter SIFMA Letter]; Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, Jr., Gen.
Counsel & Dir. of Regulatory Relations, The Risk Mgmt. Ass’n, to Legislative &
Regulatory Activities Div. et al. (July 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/conten
tStreamer?documentId=OCC-2011-0001-2387&attachmentNumber=1&contentType
=pdf [hereinafter The Risk Mgmt. Ass’n Letter].
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attract talent in the field,160 and they suggest a principles-based 
approach to minimize risk over a more prescriptive rule-based 
approach.161 
Incentive-based compensation programs are critical tools in the 
management of financial institutions,162 and they are often used as 
tools to attract the most talented individuals in the field.163  But as 
financial institutions begin to offer aggressive incentives to compete 
for the best talent, financial interest can override effective risk 
management.164  This very pattern of behavior was predominate in 
financial institutions in the years leading up to the financial crisis of 
2007.165  To keep the talent in-house, financial institutions “began 
providing aggressive incentives, often tied to the price of their shares 
and often with accelerated payouts.”166  As the profitability of the 
firms grew, the compensation packages increased for senior 
executives and key employees, and the firms did little to check risky 
behavior.167  Where risk is so inherent in the make-up of incentive-
based compensation, there needs to be regulation addressing the 
issue.  
Those opposed to the Rule would prefer a principles-based 
approach, similar to the 2010 Guidance168 and the 2011 Proposed 
Rule,169 as opposed to more prescriptive rules.170  Such an approach 
160. See, e.g., Ctr. on Exec. Comp. Letter, supra note 159, at 16; SIFMA Letter, supra
note 159, at 4; The Risk Mgmt. Ass’n Letter, supra note 159, at 30, 45.
161. See, e.g., Ctr. on Exec. Comp. Letter, supra note 159, at 4; SIFMA Letter, supra note
159, at 2–3; The Risk Mgmt. Ass’n Letter, supra note 159, at 5.
162. See Jian Cai et al., Compensation and Risk Incentives in Banking and Finance, FED. 
RES. BANK CLEV. (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.clevelandfed.org/~/media/content/n
ewsroom%20and%20events/publications/economic%20commentary/2010/ec%2020
1013%20compensation%20and%20risk%20incentives/ec%20201013%20compensat
ion%20and%20risk%20incentives%20in%20banking%20and%20finance%20pdf.pd
f. Well-structured incentive-based arrangements align the interest of executives and
employees with the interests of the institution’s shareholders.  Id.
163. See id.
164. See John Thanassoulis, The Case for Intervening in Bankers’ Pay, 67 J. FIN. 849,
850 (2012) (“[C]ompetition by banks for bankers generates an empirically relevant
negative externality that drives up rival banks’ default risk.”).
165. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 44, at 62–63.  “When . . . investment banks went
public . . . the close relationship between bankers’ decisions and their compensation
broke down.  They were now trading with shareholders’ money.  Talented traders
and managers once tethered to their firms were now free agents who could play
companies against each other for more money.”  Id. at 62.
166. Id. (noting that commercial banks followed suit to remain competitive in the
industry).
167. See id. at 62–63.
168. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
169. See supra Section IV.A.
170. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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would allow for more discretion in making incentive-based 
compensation decisions.171  In July 2016, Wells Fargo submitted a 
comment to the 2016 Proposed Rule advocating this point.172  In its 
comment, Wells Fargo stated: 
In line with the 2010 Guidance, we have used a principles-
based approach to identify those team members who could 
have a material impact on the safety and soundness of Wells 
Fargo and to establish compensation arrangements that 
manage specific underlying risks and differentiate among 
diverse risk profiles.  
. . . . 
 We identify material risk takers and balance risk and 
reward in our incentive compensation arrangements through 
our Incentive Compensation Risk Management Program . . . 
.  We believe our ICRM Program has allowed us to achieve 
both our risk management objectives and our other 
compensation goals.173 
Yet, as the Wells Fargo incident suggests, a principles-based 
approach does not always adequately address the inherent risk, nor 
does it properly disincentivize risk-taking.174  “[D]iscretionary 
decisions can undermine the goal of incentive-based compensation 
arrangements to . . . balance risk and reward” when used improperly 
or inadequately.175 
Notably, the 2016 Proposed Rule does not eliminate a principles-
based approach altogether.176  The Rule uses this approach to allow 
“covered institutions . . . the flexibility to structure incentive-based 
compensation arrangements that do not constitute excessive 
compensation.”177  However, the rule attempts to prescribe certain 
requirements on covered institutions to limit the inherent risk of 
incentive-based compensation arrangements.178  While these 
171. See Black, supra note 66, at 9.
172. Hope A. Hardison, Senior EVP, Chief Admin. Officer & Dir. of Human Res., Wells
Fargo, to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. et
al. 2–3 (July 22, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-16/s70716-48.pdf.
173. Id.
174. See supra Part III.
175. 2016 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 37,712.
176. See id. at 37,781.
177. Id.; supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
178. See supra Section IV.B (describing the deferral requirement, the forfeiture and
downward adjustment provision, and the clawback requirement).
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requirements may be ineffective in their current form,179 they are 
necessary additions to the principles-based aspects of the 2016 
Proposed Rule to disincentivize risk-taking at covered institutions.    
VI. CONCLUSION
Poorly structured incentive-based compensation arrangements can
have substantial effects on the health of the United States 
economy.180  Since the passage of Dodd-Frank, federal regulators 
have taken steps to address the inherent risk in such arrangements.181  
However, the principle-based approach of current agency guidance 
has given financial institutions too much discretion in structuring 
their incentive-based compensation arrangements, leading to 
damaging consequences as demonstrated by the Wells Fargo 
scandal.182 
The Agencies’ 2016 Proposed Rule seeks to address this issue by 
implementing more prescriptive rules to regulate incentive-based 
compensation arrangements.183  Yet, if the 2016 Proposed Rule were 
to be promulgated in its current form, it would be ineffective at 
achieving its intended goal of disincentivizing risk.184  The rule must 
be strengthened by extending the deferral period, requiring use of the 
clawback provision thereby limiting the discretion given to financial 
institutions, and utilizing new language to hold senior executives 
accountable for misconduct and harm to the institution.185 
179. See supra Section V.A.
180. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Section II.C.
182. See supra Part III.
183. See supra Section IV.B.
184. See supra Section V.A.
185. See supra Section V.A.
